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1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the country’s discourse around felon
disenfranchisement has gained significant attention. Around the country,
courts have addressed this issue in various forms. In nearly every case, felon
disenfranchisement laws have been upheld. 1 This Paper joins the discussion
regarding t constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement. While much of the
litigation to date has centered on rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, this Paper focuses on the Minnesota Constitution. In a recent
Minnesota district court case, Schroeder v. Minnesota Secretary of State,
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the Minnesota Secretary
of State, Steve Simon, arguing that Minnesota’s felon disenfranchisement
statute violates the Minnesota Constitution. 2 The Ramsey County court
dismissed the case on August 19, 2020. 3 This Paper argues that the district
court erred in dismissing the case. In its order, the court relied on a narrow
definition of fundamental rights, a selective historical analysis, and a national
rather than international legal comparison. 4 The court ultimately held that
the power to regulate felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement lies
exclusively with the legislative branch. 5 While this may be true to an extent,
this Paper argues that the legislature’s ability to regulate enfranchisement
cannot go unconstrained. Indeed, it is the court’s job to ensure that the
legislative branch operates within its constitutional limits. 6
Lindsay Dreyer is a 2022 Juris Doctor candidate at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The
author previously worked as a Fellow for the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy
Project, where she taught a high school government course. Special thanks to the students of
her class, whose curiosity about felon disenfranchisement inspired this Paper.
Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 369 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[F]elons fall outside the
scope of the fundamental right to vote.”); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 170 (2d Cir.
2010) (quoting Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough the right to
vote is generally considered fundamental, in the absence of any allegation that a challenged
classification was intended to discriminate on the basis of race or other suspected criteria,
statutes that deny felons the right to vote are not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”); Johnson
v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Having lost their voting rights, Plaintiffs
lack any fundamental interest to assert.”); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114–15 (5th
Cir. 1978) (“[S]elective disenfranchisement or reenfranchisement of convicted felons must
pass the standard level of scrutiny applied to state laws.”).
Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440
(Minn.
Dist.
Ct.
Aug.
11,
2020),
https://www.minnpost.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/62-cv-19-7440-SMJ-order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DEK4-M8LL]
[hereinafter Order].
ǂ
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4
5
6

Id.
See discussion infra Sections V.C–E.
See discussion infra Sections V.C–E.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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Section II of this Paper outlines the history of felon
disenfranchisement in ancient Greece and the United States, where these
laws have been adopted and expanded upon. Section III provides an
overview of felon disenfranchisement today, paying close attention to the
current trends in Minnesota. Section IV introduces Schroeder v. Minnesota
Secretary of State, detailing the procedural posture of the case, the facts, and
a brief overview of the legal arguments on each side. Finally, Section V
provides a critique of the court’s decision. The court interpreted the
Minnesota Constitution as granting the legislature virtually unchecked
power over felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement. This Paper
analyzes the court’s order and offers a more judicious interpretation of
article VII of the Minnesota Constitution.
II.

A.

HISTORY OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT

European Roots

The idea of barring certain individuals from participating in politics
due to their criminal actions can be traced back over two thousand years to
ancient Greece and Rome. 7 In ancient Greece, those who committed
certain serious offenses were “pronounced infamous” and barred from
voting, making public speeches, and serving in the army. 8 In ancient Rome,
convicted criminals were branded with infamia and were similarly barred
from holding office and voting. 9 Additionally, those who “were convicted
were exiled from society and carried their infamia with them as a badge of
their dishonor.” 10 Infamia was so damaging that some would “opt for exile
over [a] trial” to spare themselves the public shame of being condemned
with infamia before exile. 11
This practice of isolating and shaming individuals with criminal
backgrounds was continuously adopted by succeeding nations. During the
Renaissance, criminals were labeled “outlaws” as they were deemed to be
outside the protections of the law, and thus could be killed with impunity. 12
The isolation and humiliation that came with losing one’s civil rights served
Alec Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement
Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059–60 (2002).
Id. at 1059.
Id. Infamia was a form of censure, which “applied to a citizen who was awaiting trial
7

8
9

and followed them from their conviction to exile. If the individual ‘returned to Rome after
exile, [they] could be killed on sight.’ Additionally, [their] property was confiscated upon
conviction and [they were] stripped of [their] political and civil rights.” Shadman
Zaman, Violence and Exclusion: Felon Disenfranchisement as a Badge of Slavery, 46
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 264 (2015).
Zaman, supra note 9, at 265.
10
11

Id.

12

Ewald, supra note 7, at 1159.

2
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“both as a form of retribution and as a deterrent from crime.” 13 Later, in
medieval Europe, the principle of “civil death” was developed. 14 Those who
“commit[ted] serious crime[s] against society forfeit[ed] their civic
personhood.” 15 The criminal was said to be “dead in law.” 16 Although laws
allowing for disenfranchisement were widespread in ancient and early
European society, this harsh penalty was reserved only for the most severe
crimes. 17 Furthermore, disenfranchisement was implemented on a case-bycase basis and only after judicial pronouncement. 18 It was not until the U.S.
Civil War that a nation made disenfranchisement automatic and allencompassing.

B.

Pre-Civil War America

Early colonial disenfranchisement laws adopted the European
concept of disenfranchisement and emerged in the 1600s. 19 The colonies
limited the penalty to certain offenses, usually related to voting or “egregious
violations of the moral code.” 20 After the Revolutionary War, states began
to incorporate disenfranchisement clauses into their state constitutions. The
Kentucky Constitution of 1792 disenfranchised those convicted of “bribery,
perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors.” 21 Mirroring the
language of the Kentucky Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution of 1812
barred those convicted of “bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or
misdemeanors” from voting. 22 Similarly, the Ohio Constitution of 1802
limited disenfranchisement to crimes of “bribery, perjury, or otherwise
infamous crime[s].” 23 Minnesota chose slightly different language when
outlining its disenfranchisement clause. The original draft of Minnesota’s
Constitution in 1857 stated:

Angela Behrens, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236
13

(2004).
Christina Rivers, A Brief History of Felon Disenfranchisement and Prison
Gerrymanders, ORG. AM. HISTORIANS, https://www.oah.org/tah/issues/2017/november/a14

brief-history-of-felon-disenfranchisement-and-prison-gerrymanders/ [https://perma.cc/TJR69RKJ].
15

Id.

16

Ewald, supra note 7, at 1059.
Id. at 1060.
Id.
George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32

17
18
19

FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 103 (2005).
JEAN CHUNG, THE SENT’G PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 3
(Dec. 2019).
KY. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 2.
LA. CONST. of 1812, art. VI, § 4.
OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 4.
20

21
22
23
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No person shall be qualified to vote at any election who shall be
convicted of treason—or any felony—or of voting, or attempting to
vote, more than once at any election—or of procuring or inducing
any person to vote illegally at any election; Provided, That the
Governor or the Legislature may restore any such person to civil
rights. 24
The Minnesota Constitution was one of the first constitutions to use
the word “felony” in its disenfranchisement clause. 25 Of course, in the
nineteenth century, the word “felony” had a notably different meaning than
the modern understanding of the word. 26 Thus, while the language of the
clause differed from other states’ constitutions, the essence of the law was
the same: disenfranchisement was reserved for egregious crimes and crimes
related to dishonesty and voting. Moreover, despite the prevalence of
disenfranchisement laws in the nineteenth century, the laws were poorly
enforced prior to the Civil War. 27 Given the nature of voting in the
nineteenth century, it was difficult to verify if someone had been disqualified
by a criminal conviction unless those attending the polls knew the
disqualified person personally. 28 Furthermore, there were few reported
instances of voting crimes during this time. 29 It was not until the Civil War
that states became more concerned with monitoring the polls. 30

C.

Post-Civil War
The post-Civil War expansion of voting rights threatened the power

T.F. ANDREWS, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA 540 (G.W. Moore ed. 1858).
MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
In 1858, a Minnesota statute defined “felony” as “a public offense punishable with
death, or which is, in the discretion of the court may be, punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary or territorial prison.” MINN. STAT. § 87.3 (1858) (abrogated and presently
codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.02 (2020)). Therefore, felonies were reserved for crimes
punishable by death.
JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 56 (2006).
See id. at 53.
In the town hall meeting, the disenfranchisement of offenders was enforceable
through direct social means: the offender was known to the community, and
easily barred from attempting to participate. The transition to a modern
democratic regime . . . made direct (and systematic) enforcement more difficult
because offenders could not necessarily be identified by sight.
24

25
26

27

28

Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 55. “The most notable of these concerns was a fear of fraud, as well as more
29
30

obscure fears on the part of some that the integrity of the ballot box would be tainted by the
participation of unworthy electors.” Id. at 53.

4
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dynamics of the South. The ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments granted citizenship to an estimated four million formerly
enslaved people. 31 It also gave Black men the right to vote. 32 More than a
half-million Black men became eligible to vote in the South in the 1870s. 33
In some states, such as Mississippi, more than half of the state’s population
was Black. 34 In order to curtail the power of these new voters, practices were
quickly put in place to prevent eligible Black voters from voting. 35 For
example, poll taxes and literacy tests were established to inhibit Black
citizens from voting. 36 Grandfather clauses restricted voter registration only
to those whose grandfathers were qualified to vote before the Civil War,
similarly targeting black voters. 37 In Mississippi, the percentage of Black
voting-age men registered to vote fell from 90% during Reconstruction, to
6% in 1892. 38 However, the law with the most long-lasting discriminatory
impact on voting rights was the Thirteenth Amendment, which “carved out
an exception allowing states to impose involuntary servitude on those who
were convicted of crimes.” 39 In the years following Reconstruction, 90% of
those forced into convict leasing arrangements were Black. 40 In Alabama,
the percentage of nonwhite prisoners increased from 2% in 1850, to 74% in
1870. 41
Unsurprisingly, felon disenfranchisement laws were expanded
upon and heavily enforced in the years following the Civil War. Alabama
offers one notable example. In 1819, Alabama’s Constitution excluded
those “convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or
misdemeanors” from voting. 42 This clause mirrored other
disenfranchisement clauses during this period. However, in 1901, Alabama
adopted a new constitution, which greatly expanded the scope of its
disenfranchisement clause. The clause explicitly disenfranchised:
This number is approximate, based on data collected in the 1860 census. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860, at viii (1860).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
Race and Voting in the Segregated South, CONST. RTS. FOUND., https://www.crfusa.org/black-history-month/race-and-voting-in-the-segregated-south
[https://perma.cc/5VLR-NEST].
31

32

33

34
35
36
37
38

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

ERIN KELLEY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., RACISM & FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT:
AN INTERTWINED HISTORY 1 (May 9, 2017).
Id. at 2.
39

40
41

Id.

42

ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, § 5.

5

6

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

All idiots and insane persons; those who shall by reason of
conviction of crime be disqualified from voting at the time of the
ratification of this Constitution; those who shall be convicted of
treason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office,
larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining property or money
under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of perjury, robbery,
assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and
battery on the wife, bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy, incest,
rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any
infamous crime or crime involving moral turpitude; also, any
person who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or of selling
or offering to sell his vote or the vote of another, or of buying or
offering to buy the vote of another, or of making or offering to
make a false return in any election by the people or in any
primary election to procure the nomination or election of any
person to any office, or of suborning any witness or registrar to
secure the registration of any person as an elector. 43
The president of Alabama’s Constitutional Convention made the
purpose of the new provision clear, proclaiming the need to avert the
“menace of Negro domination.” 44 One official noted that “[t]he crime of
wife-beating alone would disqualify 60 percent of the Negros.” 45
In 1890, Mississippi followed suit during its Constitutional
Convention. The Convention expanded the disenfranchisement provision
from “bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime[s],” 46 to “bribery, burglary,
theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury,
forgery, embezzlement or bigamy, and [those] who [had not] paid . . . all
taxes.” 47 The delegates at the Convention made it clear that crimes added to
the list were offenses “to which its weaker member [of society] were
prone.” 48
Post-Civil War America marked the beginning of modern felon
disenfranchisement. Many states amended their constitutions to expand the
reach of disenfranchisement. But Minnesota’s provision was unique. 49 The
ALA. CONST., art. VIII, § 182 (repealed 1996).
Brent Staples, Opinion, The Racist Origins of Felon Disenfranchisement, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-racist-origins-of-felondisenfranchisement.html [https://perma.cc/U486-PRL2].
43
44

45

Id.

MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §17.
MISS. CONST., art. XII, § 241 (amended 1972).
KELLEY, supra note 39, at 3.
Unlike in the South, where states prohibited discreet crimes, see, e.g., ALA. CONST.
of 1819, art. VI, § 5; MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §17, Minnesota’s constitutional
prohibition was written broadly, which allowed the state to apply its prohibitions more
46
47
48
49
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state’s disenfranchisement provision did not need to change as it had in
other states around the country. Rather, the language was already sufficiently
broad so as to allow for a gradual expansion. The word “felony” could
encompass whatever crimes the legislature wanted. While its language may
have remained the same, the pervasiveness of disenfranchisement, its
widespread application, and its impact on minority communities made
Minnesota’s provision effectively identical to those in the South.
III.

A.

DISENFRANCHISEMENT TODAY

Modern Felon Disenfranchisement

Today, in the United States, there are six categories of felon
disenfranchisement: (1) permanent disenfranchisement for all felons; 50 (2)
permanent disenfranchisement for some felons, depending on the offense; 51
(3) restoration of voting rights after completion of one’s sentence, including
parole or probation; 52 (4) restoration of voting rights after completion of
one’s prison sentence and parole; 53 (5) restoration of voting rights after
release from prison; 54 and (6) no disenfranchisement 55 regardless of the
offense. 56
Approximately 2.5% of the United States’ voting age population, or
6.1 million people, is disenfranchised due to a felony conviction. 57 Of those
disqualified from voting, 77% “live in their communities, either under
flexibly. See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“The following persons shall not be entitled or
permitted to vote at any election in this state: . . . a person who has been convicted of treason
or felony, unless restored to civil rights; a person under guardianship, or a person who is
insane or not mentally competent.”).
Currently, only Kentucky and Virginia permanently disenfranchise people with felony
convictions. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/voting-rights/voter-restoration/felony-disenfranchisement-lawsmap [https://perma.cc/BU2U-VHZL].
Iowa, Colorado, Arizona, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida permanently
disenfranchise some felons, depending on the offense. Id.
Nineteen states, including Wisconsin, Washington, Idaho, and Georgia, restore voting
rights after completion of one’s sentence. Id.
New York and Connecticut restore voting rights after completion of one’s prison
sentence and parole. Id. People on probation in these states can vote. Id.
Eighteen states, including California, Illinois, North Dakota, and Michigan, restore
voting rights after release from prison. Id.
Only Maine and Vermont have no felon disenfranchisement laws. Id.
John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the Eighth
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 764 (2013).
Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson & Sarah Shannon, 6 Million Lost Voters: StateLevel Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimatesfelony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [https://perma.cc/P3WW-JBEU].
50

51

52

53

54

55
56

57
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probation or parole supervision or having completed their sentence.” 58
Felon disenfranchisement policies disproportionately impact communities
of color, with voting age Black Americans being four times more likely to
lose their voting rights than the rest of the adult population. 59 Furthermore,
one in every thirteen Black adults is disenfranchised nationally, and, in
several states, 60 more than one in five Black adults is disenfranchised. 61

B.

Felon Disenfranchisement in Minnesota

In Minnesota, the numbers are worse than the national average.
One out of every eight Black Minnesotans is prohibited from voting due to
a felony conviction. 62 Currently, 53,000 Minnesotans outside of jail or prison
cannot vote because of a felony conviction. 63 Although Black citizens
comprise 4% of Minnesota’s voting-age population, they account for more
than 20% of disenfranchised voters living in the community. 64 Comparably,
Indigenous people make up less than 1% of Minnesota’s voting-age
population but comprise nearly 7% of those disenfranchised. 65 Minnesota’s
probation and supervised release policies only exacerbate these numbers.
Minnesota has the seventh-highest supervised population per capita in the
country. 66
While the language of the disenfranchisement provision in the
Minnesota Constitution has remained the same since 1857, its purpose and
application have drastically changed. This Paper argues that article VII can
no longer be used to justify modern disenfranchisement in Minnesota. As
applied today, felon disenfranchisement under Minnesota Statutes section
609.165 violates the Minnesota Constitution.
IV.

SCHROEDER V. MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE

In October 2019, the ACLU brought the issue of felon
disenfranchisement to Ramsey County Court, challenging the
constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes section 609.165. 67 In response to the
58

CHUNG, supra note 20, at 2.

59

Id.

60

The states are Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id.
Id.
Voting Rights Restoration, AM. C.L. UNION: MINN., https://www.aclu-

61
62

mn.org/en/campaigns/voting-rights-restoration [https://perma.cc/S28V-GHDN].
63
64

Id.
ALCU-MN Sues to Restore Voting Rights in Minnesota, AM. C.L. UNION: MINN.

(Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/press-releases/aclu-mn-sues-restore-votingrights-minnesota [https://perma.cc/AZD6-LQJ2].
65
66

Id.
Id.

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of
State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Complaint].
67

8
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complaint, both the state and the court narrowly defined the fundamental
right to vote and applied a selective historical analysis. The court ultimately
held that the power to regulate re-enfranchisement lies exclusively with the
legislative branch. 68 While this may be true to an extent, the legislature’s
ability to regulate re-enfranchisement cannot go unconstrained. Indeed, it is
the court’s job to ensure that the legislative branch operates within its
constitutional limits. 69 In Schroeder v. Minnesota Secretary of State, the
court interpreted the Minnesota Constitution in a manner that gave the
legislature virtually unchecked power over felon disenfranchisement and reenfranchisement.

A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

On October 21, 2019, the plaintiffs in Schroeder filed a complaint
against the Minnesota Secretary of State seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief in Ramsey County, Minnesota. 70 The complaint was written on behalf
of four plaintiffs, each of whom were on parole, probation, or some other
form of supervised release. 71 As such, they were unable to vote. 72 The
complaint alleged that section 609.165, 73 which outlines Minnesota’s system
of re-enfranchisement after a felony conviction, violates the plaintiffs’ right
to vote and equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution. 74
The first plaintiff, Jennifer Schroeder, was convicted of drug
possession in 2013. 75 She was sentenced to one year in county jail and forty
Order, supra note 2, at 12.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
The Minnesota Voter Alliance, a self-identified election security group, sought limited
intervention, contending that, as taxpayers, the organization had an interest in “meritless
lawsuit[s].” See Notice of Limited Intervention to Assert the Defense of Lack of Private
Cause of Action at 1, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Apr. 3, 2020). Both the district court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that
the organization failed to meet the factors necessary for both intervention of right and
permissive intervention. See Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, 950 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2020).
Schroeder, 950 N.W.2d at 74.
68
69
70

71
72

Id.

73

Adopted into law in 1963, the statute states the following:
When a person has been deprived of civil rights by reason of conviction of a
crime and is thereafter discharged, such discharge shall restore the person to all
civil rights and to full citizenship, with full right to vote and hold office, the same
as if such conviction had not taken place, and the order of discharge shall so
provide.

MINN. STAT. § 609.165, subdiv. 1 (2020).
74

Complaint, supra note 67, at 2.

75

Id. at 3.

9

10

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

years of probation. 76 Due to her felony conviction and probation, she will
be unable to vote until 2053. 77 Ms. Schroeder is now a drug and alcohol
counselor and works with those struggling with addiction. 78 The second
plaintiff, Elizer Eugene Darris, served seventeen years in prison due to a
second-degree homicide conviction. 79 He was released from prison in 2016
and will remain ineligible to vote until 2025. 80 Since his release, Mr. Darris
has worked on several political campaigns and volunteered as a mentor and
re-entry coach. 81 The third plaintiff, Christopher James Jecevicus-Varner,
was convicted of a drug offense in 2014. 82 He is currently serving twenty
years on probation and will be unable to vote until 2034. 83 Mr. JecevicusVarner successfully completed drug treatment and is now working as an
electrician. 84 The final plaintiff, Tierre Davon Caldwell, was convicted of
assault in 2010 and remains ineligible to vote due to his ongoing probation. 85
He is now a concrete laborer and has become involved in local politics. 86

B.

The Court Order

On August 11, 2020, Judge Laura Nelson granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. 87 The order began with a discussion of the
history of felon voting, borrowing most of the sources found in the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 88 The court noted that twentyfour states practiced disenfranchisement during the pre-Civil War period. 89
Additionally, the court laid out Minnesota’s history of felon
disenfranchisement. 90 The court indicated that there had been several
versions of disenfranchisement statutes before the current version, section
609.165, was passed. 91 Again appearing to borrow from the defendant’s
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
Schroeder v. Minn. Secretary of State, AM. C.L. UNION: MINN. (Oct. 21, 2019),

https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/cases/schroeder-v-mn-secretary-state
58NT].
Complaint, supra note 67, at 3.

[https://perma.cc/T2LF-

79
80

Id.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
at 22, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment].
81

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id.
Order, supra note 2, at 13.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
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motion, the court concluded that section 609.165 was created with a clear
governmental purpose: “to promote the rehabilitation of the defendant and
his return to his community as an effective participating citizen.” 92
Next, the court analyzed the equal protection claim. The court held
that because Minnesota’s Constitution explicitly limited the right to vote,
persons convicted of a felony lacked any fundamental right to vote under
the state Constitution. 93 Thus, a fundamental right was not at issue. The
court noted that while a heightened rational basis review is, at times, used
when a statutory classification adversely affects one race more than another,
that basis of review was not appropriate in Schroeder. 94 The court reasoned
that the heightened rational basis review had not been applied by the
Minnesota Supreme Court since 1991, 95 and the court stated that any right
or restriction triggered by a criminal conviction would have a similar
disproportionate impact on minority communities. 96 Thus, the court
concluded, a heightened basis of review was not practical. Therefore, the
court applied rational basis review.
Under regular rational basis review, the court found that a legitimate
government interest existed and concluded that the law did not violate the
state’s Equal Protection Clause. 97 The court used a similar analysis in
evaluating the due process claim. Since a fundamental right was not at issue,
rational basis review again applied. 98 The court held that the means used to
achieve the governmental purpose of rehabilitation under section 609.165
were reasonable. 99
The district court then granted summary judgment for the defendant. 100
On September 30, 2020, the plaintiffs served a notice of appeal to the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, 101 which the appellate court affirmed on May
24, 2021. 102 On August 10, 2021, Minnesota Supreme Court granted
Schroeder’s petition for review. 103 Oral arugments are scheduled for
November 30, 2021. 104
Id. at 2 (citing ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION
MINNESOTA CRIMINAL CODE 60–61 (West 1962)).
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8–9.
92

OF THE

CRIM. L., PROPOSED

93
94
95
96
97
98
99

100

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 13.

Notice of Appeal to Court of Appeals at 1, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No.
62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2020).
Schroeder v. Simon, 962 N.W.2d 471, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021).
Schroeder v. Simon, No. A20-1264 (Minn. Aug. 10, 2021) (order granting petition
for review).
Schroeder v. Simon, No. A20-1264 (Minn. Oct. 26, 2021 (order scheduling oral
101

102
103
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ANALYSIS

The Court’s Reliance on the Federal Standard

Both the state and federal courts’ unwillingness to strike down felon
disenfranchisement laws stems from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment in Richardson v. Ramirez. 105 In Richardson,
three California residents filed a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court
of California to compel California county election officials to register them
to vote. 106 They claimed that California’s felon disenfranchisement law,
which disenfranchised persons convicted of an “infamous crime,” violated
their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 107 The Supreme Court of California reviewed
the statute with strict scrutiny and held that the statute was unconstitutional. 108
The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari. 109
The United States Supreme Court looked to Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment for guidance. Section 2 states:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of
a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any
of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. 110
The Court concluded that Section 2 affirmatively sanctioned the
exclusion of felons from voting. 111 Thus, felon disenfranchisement laws were
not to be afforded strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. 112
Rather, the Court held that the appropriate standard of review was rational
argument).
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 28.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
Id. at 54–55.
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
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basis review. 113 Because the respondents could not prove discriminatory
intent, the case was reversed. 114 Since Richardson, the Fourteenth
Amendment has proven a nearly insurmountable barrier for convicted
felons seeking to invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws. 115 Without
evidence of the legislature’s intent to purposefully discriminate,
disenfranchisement laws will likely survive a rational basis review. Not
surprisingly, few disenfranchisement cases have been able to prove
discriminatory intent.
Case law illustrates just how difficult it is to prove discriminatory intent.
In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court held that an Alabama Constitutional
provision disenfranchising those convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 116 The Court cited evidence
from the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, where the president
stated that the purpose of the Convention was to “establish white supremacy
in the State.” 117 Those at the Convention specifically selected crimes “that
were thought to be more commonly committed by [B]lacks.” 118 Hunter
created the standard for striking down a disenfranchisement law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a standard few cases thereafter have met.
In Schroeder, Judge Nelson’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment mirrored the Court’s reasoning in Richardson. 119
Similar to Richardson, the judge looked to the language of the Minnesota
Constitution to determine if voting was a fundamental right. 120 Because the
Minnesota Constitution affirmatively sanctions the disenfranchisement of
felons, 121 the judge held that those convicted of a felony do not have a
fundamental right to vote in Minnesota. 122 The judge concluded her order
by quoting the majority opinion in Richardson, emphasizing that the power
to change felon disenfranchisement laws lies with the legislature. 123 If the
legislature fails to make changes, the order quoted, “their failure is some
evidence, at least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument.” 124
113
114

Id.
Id. at 56.

Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering Without Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement
Constitutes Vote Denial Under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE &
115

POVERTY L.J. 61, 79 (2011).
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 232.
See generally Order, supra note 2.
116
117
118
119
120
121

See generally id.
See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“The following persons shall not be entitled or

permitted to vote at any election in this state: . . . a person who has been convicted of treason
or felony, unless restored to civil rights.”).
Order, supra note 2, at 7.
Id. at 12.
Id. (quoting Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974)).
122
123
124
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Ultimately, the district court in Schroeder, like the Court in
Richardson, held that the legislature has virtually unconstrained power to
regulate felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement. Under

Richardson, legislatures have the complete authority to define which crimes

fall under the “other crimes” provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, so
long as the legislature does not explicitly state its intention to discriminate—
an absurdly low bar. Similarly, under Schroeder, the Minnesota legislature
has unchecked power to define what crimes constitute a felony, a definition
which has expanded over time. In an effort to create clear boundaries
between the legislature and the judiciary, the courts have allowed for the
gradual erosion of voting rights in Minnesota and in states across the
country. 125 In the process, felon disenfranchisement provisions have been
exploited and expanded. 126
While state legislatures have the power to create felon
disenfranchisement laws, the courts have the power to set constitutional
limits on their expansion. 127 Richardson chose not to address the
constitutional limits on the expansion of felon disenfranchisement. 128
Accordingly, state and federal courts, such as the court in Schroeder, have
also chosen to avoid this question and instead align their reasoning with the
majority opinion in Richardson. 129 But the basic question in Richardson
remains unanswered. In looking to define the constitutional limits of felon
disenfranchisement, Richardson’s dissenting opinion provides a sound
roadmap.

B.

The Power of Dissent

Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote the dissenting
opinion in Richardson. 130 In discussing the constitutionality of California’s
disenfranchisement law, Justice Marshall began with a historical analysis of
the Fourteenth Amendment. While the majority concluded that Congress
intended to affirmatively sanction felon disenfranchisement in Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 131 Justice Marshall interpreted the Section’s
See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html
[https://perma.cc/4HLP-QHU3].
See supra Section II.C; see also Morgan McLeod, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades
of Felony Disenfranchisment Reforms, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
expanding-vote-two-decades-felonydisenfranchisement-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/5AP8-6BEN].
See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 24.
125

126

127
128
129
130
131

See generally id.
See generally Order, supra note 2.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
See id. at 43 (“[W]hat legislative history there is indicates that this language was

intended by Congress to mean what it says.”).
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intent more narrowly. According to him, as acknowledged by the majority, 132
Section 2 was the result of a “compromise” between the North and the
South. 133 The northern Republicans were concerned that the increased
representation in the South would impact their political dominance. They
also knew that southern Black men were more likely to support the
Republican party. 134 Rather than force the South to enfranchise Black men,
Section 2 was a compromise that gave the South a choice: “enfranchise
Negro voters or lose congressional representation.” 135 In that sense, Section
2 was intended to be a “remedy supplementary” to the other sections in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 136 The Section was intended to expand, not limit,
enfranchisement overall. The provisions of Section 2, Justice Marshall
argued, were not intended to sanction election discrimination. 137 Moreover,
they were “not forever immunized from evolving standards of equal
protection scrutiny.” 138 Thus, Justice Marshall concluded, all voting
restrictions, even the two types of disenfranchisement listed in Section 2,
were subject to strict scrutiny under Section 1 of the Amendment.
Justice Marshall additionally contended that the “other crimes”
language in Section 2 was a congressional afterthought and that the language
was not meant to have such broad implications on voting. There is little
evidence as to why Congress added the “other crimes” language to Section
2 in the first place. 139 Section 2 went to the joint committee containing only
the phrase “participation in rebellion,” but left the committee with “other
crimes” inexplicably tacked on. 140 Justice Marshall argued that the lack of
legislative history emphasized that Congress did not intend for the words to
have such great significance. 141 Many states had similar language in their state
constitutions at the time. 142 As noted above, these provisions were not
enforced before the Civil War. 143 Rather, they were largely remnants of “the
fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtless [had] been brought
forward into modern statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its
literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our

See id. (“[T]he framers of the Amendment were primarily concerned with the effect
of reduced representation upon the States, rather than with the two forms of
disenfranchisement which were exempted from that consequence.”).
Id. at 73 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id. at 74.
See id. at 75 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 278 (1970)).
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 77.
See supra Section II.B.
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system of government.” 144 In other words, disenfranchisement clauses were
largely symbolic limitations on voting. The symbolic nature of
disenfranchisement laws during this time and the lack of legislative history
further demonstrate that Congress likely did not intend for the words to be
read as separate from the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The dissent’s reasoning could similarly be applied to the Minnesota
Constitution’s sanction of felon disenfranchisement. While section 1 of
article VII allows the legislature to disqualify those “convicted of treason or
felony” from voting, 145 the legislative history of the provision shows that the
drafters of the state constitution had little idea of what this provision meant
or the impact it would have on our ability to vote in the state.
In discussing this provision during the Minnesota Constitutional
Convention, one delegate moved to strike the entire section. 146 He noted
that the provision was “certainly a very stringent one, and difficult of
application, and in many cases would work great hardship.” 147 The delegate
further noted that the felony language of the section was “unusual” and that
he had “never seen it in any other Constitution.” 148 The delegate’s motion to
strike the provision did not succeed, but the discussion demonstrates the
nature of disenfranchisement laws during the nineteenth century. 149 Such
laws existed for hundreds of years in Europe and Colonial America, 150 yet
people still did not fully understand their significance. This lack of
understanding was due largely to the lack of enforcement of
disenfranchisement laws before the Civil War. 151 These clauses were historic
remnants. States included them in their constitutions but had little idea as
to how the laws would be applied.
Likely, these states did not care how or if these provisions would be
applied at all. So few people were convicted of felonies during this period
that the delegates likely did not envision this provision having any real
impact on the state. In the 1850s, 0.115% of the United States population
was convicted of a crime each year, and only 0.029% of the population was
incarcerated. 152 Moreover, notions of parole and supervised release had not
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 85–86 (quoting Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949
(Okla. 1914)).
MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
ANDREWS, supra note 24, at 540.
144

145
146
147
148

Id.
Id.

No further discussion preceded the vote on the delegate’s motion. Id. at 540–41.
Following the vote, the remainder of the discussion centered on restoring voting rights. The
delegates specifically included a provision granting the Governor or the Legislature the power
to restore voting rights. Id. at 541. They did not want to “cut off the power of the Legislature
[or Governor] to restore civil rights to any person.” Id. at 540.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.
The first statistic was found by dividing the number of convictions per 100,000 people
149

150
151
152
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yet been introduced in America. 153 In contrast, today, 2.5% of the population
is either incarcerated or under some form of supervised release. 154 The
number of people incarcerated or under supervised release is more than
eighty-five times the number in the 1850s. Black people are
disproportionately represented in these numbers. In Minnesota, an
estimated 15 to 20% of African Americans have a felony conviction. 155
Nationally, the numbers are higher. Around 33% of African Americans
have a felony conviction. 156 Fifty-three thousand African Americans are on
probation or supervised release in Minnesota and currently cannot vote. 157
To put that in perspective, only 44,593 votes separated Hilary Clinton from
Donald Trump in Minnesota during the 2016 general election. 158 In other
words, felon disenfranchisement laws now have the power to swing
elections.
The drafters of the Minnesota Constitution neither intended nor
foresaw the great impact this provision would have on the state. A look at
the legislative history indicates the drafters likely felt obligated to include
such a provision in the constitution and did not seem to care about its

in 1850 (115.0) by 100,000 to determine the approximate percentage of persons convicted
of a crime in the United States. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850–1984 (1986). Similarly, the second number was
found by dividing the number of people in prison per 100,000 people in 1850 (29.0) by
100,000 to find the approximate percentage of persons in prison in the United States at the
time. Id.
See ISAAC FULWOOD, U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE
SYSTEM 1 (2003) (“Parole of federal prisoners began after enactment of legislation on June
25, 1910.”).
“About 0.7% of the United States is currently in a federal or state prison or local jail.”
Peter Wagner & Wanda Bertram, What Percent of the U.S. is Incarcerated? (And Other
Ways to Measure Mass Incarceration), PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020
/01/16/percentincarcerated/#:~:text=Nearly%20one%20out%20of%20every,in%20a%20prison%20or%jaiil
.&text=We’re%20often%20asked%20what,state%20prison%20or%20local%20jail
[https://perma.cc/439F-H3Ek]. One in fifty-five adults was on probation or parole in 2016,
which is approximately 1.8%. Probation and Parole Systems Marked by High Stakes, Missed
Opportunities,
PEW
CHARITABLE
TRS.
(Sept.
25,
2018),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/09/probation-andparole-systems-marked-by-high-stakes-missed-opportunities
[https://perma.cc/4G5GGZJN].
Alan Flurry, Study Estimates U.S. Population with Felony Convictions, U. OF GA.
(Oct.
1,
2017),
https://news.uga.edu/total-us-population-with-felony-convictions/
[https://perma.cc/VTB3-QSQH].
153

154

155

156
157
158

Id.
Voting Rights Restoration, supra note 62.
Minnesota Presidential Race Results: Hillary Clinton Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1,

2017), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/minnesota-president-clinton-trump
[https://perma.cc/RJ7G-AS5U].
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practical application. 159 The legislative history does not suggest the drafters
intended to give the legislature limitless authority to expand felon
disenfranchisement. Rather, the notes from the debates make clear that
they, in fact, intended for the legislature to increase enfranchisement by
“restor[ing] civil rights to any person who may be convicted for violating the
provisions of this section.” 160 Furthermore, as Justice Marshall argued
regarding the U.S. Constitution, the disenfranchisement sanctioned in this
provision is not frozen and “forever immunized from evolving standards of
equal protection scrutiny.” 161 We are “not confined to historic notions of
equality.” 162 While the Minnesota Constitution facially sanctions
disenfranchisement of those convicted of felonies, there is no reason why
the statutes created under this provision should not be viewed with strict
scrutiny as an infringement on the fundamental right to vote, especially given
our evolving notions of equality. To exclude these statutes from the Equal
Protection Clause is to immunize them from any meaningful review.

C.

The Expansion of the Word “Felony” and the Court’s Selective
Historical Analysis

There is no question that the Minnesota Constitution disqualifies those
convicted of a “felony” from voting. The question then becomes, what
qualifies as a felony under the Minnesota Constitution? First, it is helpful to
track the historical evolution of the word felony. In feudal times, serious
crimes were not necessarily felonies. 163 To qualify as a felony, a crime had
to involve some breach of faith or truth, which was deemed an essential
element of the lord to vassal relationship. 164 Without that violation of truth,
even the most wicked crimes were not considered felonies. 165 After the
Norman Conquest of England, the feudal concept of felony was reshaped
by the common law. 166 Under common law, felonies were defined by the
punishment. Crimes that were punishable by death or loss of property were
considered felonies. 167 There were nine traditional common law felonies:
murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem,
and larceny. 168 These common law felonies were brought from Europe to
America. Colonial America continued to define felonies based on their
159
160

See generally ANDREWS, supra note 24.
Id. at 540–41.

161

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 76 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

162

Id.

Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early
American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 463 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
163

164
165
166
167
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punishments. In the early 1800s, America continued to use the common
law definition of felony. The 1832 Webster’s Dictionary defined felony as
“[i]n common law, any crime which incurs the forfeiture of lands or goods.
All offenses punishable by death are felonies.” 169
Minnesota was no different. In 1858, a felony in Minnesota was
defined as a “public offense punishable with death, or which is, in the
discretion of the court may be, punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary or territorial prison.” 170 Even after Minnesota began enacting
criminal statutes, the statutes largely followed the common law definitions
of various crimes. 171 Thus, when the delegates of the Minnesota Constitution
drafted section 1 of article VII, their idea of felony was a rather narrow one.
Those who committed felonies in Minnesota were subject to the death
penalty. 172 Since then, our definition of felony has continued to broaden. As
our definition of felony has expanded, so has article VII, section 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution. Today in Minnesota, no crime is punishable by
death. 173 Nevertheless, felonies remain a category of crimes in Minnesota. A
felony is currently defined in Minnesota as “a crime for which a sentence of
imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed.” 174 In the past
twenty-five years, Minnesota’s incarceration rate has increased by 150%. 175
The state has also created an entire system of parole and supervised release
that did not exist in 1858. Minnesota’s criminal justice system and, with that,
the categorization of crime has drastically changed.
As such, the word “felony” in article VII, section 1, should be read
narrowly, and the historical definition of felony should apply. The
Minnesota Constitution should be read to disqualify from voting only those
convicted of crimes punishable by death. All other crimes the legislature has
subsequently included in its definition of felony fall outside of the scope of
the Minnesota Constitution. The legislature, of course, has full authority to
change the definition of felony and thus expand felon disenfranchisement.
However, any expansion of disenfranchisement that exceeds the common
law definition of felony should be subject to strict scrutiny. States, including
Minnesota, have pushed back on this idea largely because they are aware
169

Felony, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1832).

170

MINN. STAT. ch. 87 § 3 (1858).

171

See O’Connell v. State, 6 Minn. 279, 285 (Minn. 1861) (“The crime of rape is a crime

at common law . . . [t]he statute does not define the crime, but prescribes the punishment.”).
MINN. STAT. ch. 87 § 3 (1858).
History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/minnesota
[https://perma.cc/3R47-T6A3] (“The death penalty in Minnesota has been abolished since
1911.”).
MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 2 (2020).
Andy Mannix, Decades of New Laws Caused Minnesota’s Prison Population Spike,
STAR TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.startribune.com/decades-of-new-laws-causedminnesota-s-prison-population-spike/367934361/ [https://perma.cc/DVU9-FPYZ].
172
173

174
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that their current disenfranchisement laws could not survive review under
strict scrutiny. 176 While the government would likely argue that convicted
felons, even under an expansive definition, should not be able to vote while
incarcerated, any governmental interests of felon disenfranchisement after
a person has been released from prison are tenuous at best. 177

D.

The Court’s Narrow Definition of Fundamental Right

The United States Supreme Court has declared the right to vote “the
essence of a democratic society.” 178 Any restrictions on the right to vote
“strike at the heart of representative government.” 179 Moreover, Minnesota
has recognized the right to vote as a fundamental right. 180 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota has affirmed that “[n]o right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.” 181 Not only has the court
acknowledged that the right to vote is fundamental, but it recognized that
“[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.” 182 While the right to vote may be restricted under the
Minnesota Constitution, these restrictions cannot go unchecked, as voting
is a fundamental right.
Under the narrow definition of felony provided in the Minnesota
Constitution, only those convicted of treason or a crime punishable by death
fall outside of the scope of the fundamental right to vote. This interpretation
of the provision best protects an individual’s right to vote and aligns with the
state’s view of voting as a fundamental right. 183
In Minnesota, the exercise of political franchise is a fundamental
right. 184 In Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
a “restriction that . . . denies the franchise to citizens who are otherwise
176
177

See infra Section V.F.
See infra Section V.F.
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Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964).

179

Id.

Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992)).
180

181
182
183

Id.
Id.
See Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 832 (Minn. 2005) (“It is undisputed that the

right to vote is a fundamental right under both the federal and state constitutions, and under
both constitutions any potential infringement is examined under a strict scrutiny standard of
review.”); see also Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. 1978) (“It is well
established that the exercise of the political franchise is a ‘fundamental right.’”); State ex rel.
St. Paul v. Hetherington, 240 Minn. 298, 303, 61 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1953) (“To whatever
extent a citizen is disenfranchised by denying him reasonable equality of representation, to
that extent he endures taxation without representation and the democratic process itself fails
to register the full weight of his judgment as a citizen.”).
Ulland, 262 N.W.2d at 416.
184
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qualified” to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. 185 On the other hand, if
the restriction is “more in the nature of a simple electoral regulation,” then
rational basis scrutiny applies. 186 Felon disenfranchisement is not a “simple
electoral regulation,” so strict scrutiny should apply. The court in
Schroeder, however, disagreed. 187 While the court agreed that voting is a
fundamental right, the court explained that the right is limited by the
Minnesota Constitution. 188 The “language of the Minnesota Constitution
determines what is and is not a fundamental right.” 189 Thus, the court
concluded that a person who has been convicted of a felony does not have
a fundamental right to vote in Minnesota. 190 The court arrived at this
conclusion by reading article VII expansively. According to the court, the
Minnesota Constitution disqualifies every person whom the legislature
deems to be a felon from voting. The power to disenfranchise and reenfranchise, therefore, lies exclusively with the legislature, and this power is
unlimited.
Conversely, the plaintiffs argued that the “enumerated exceptions to
voting rights” should be “implemented in a manner that narrowly tailors
deprivation of the right to vote to accomplish a well-defined and compelling
government interest.” 191 The plaintiffs’ reasoning is sound; article VII should
be read narrowly to ensure the protection of the right to vote. Any expansion
of disenfranchisement should be analyzed under strict scrutiny. As Justice
Marshall stated in the Richardson dissent, “the right to vote ‘is of the essence
of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart
of the representative government.’” 192 It follows then that article VII should
be interpreted narrowly to support this fundamental right of our democratic
society.
The court also reasoned that the Minnesota Constitution sanctions
several other different types of voting restrictions. 193 Age, residence, and
competency are other restrictions that the Minnesota Constitution places on
voting. 194 Therefore, the right to vote is a limited one. However, the felony
Erlandson, 659 N.W.2d at 733; Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 832; Hetherington, 240 Minn.
at 303, 61 N.W.2d at 741 (“The right to vote . . . is a fundamental and personal right essential
to the preservation of self-government.”).
Ulland, 262 N.W.2d at 415.
Order, supra note 2, at 13.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
185

186
187
188
189
190

Id.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 21, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr.
3, 2020).
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 77 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
Reynolds v. Simons, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
Order, supra note 2, at 6.
191

192

193
194

Id.
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restriction is distinct from the other restrictions in the state’s constitution.
Age, residence, and competency are all either defined in the constitution or
have proven to be relatively stagnant terms. Age and residence requirements
are explicitly outlined in the Minnesota Constitution. 195 Those restrictions
are clearly defined and cannot be changed absent a constitutional
amendment. Moreover, to be disqualified from voting due to
incompetency, the constitution requires that an individual be declared
legally incompetent through a court order. 196 While the definition of legal
incompetence is not clearly expressed in the constitution, this term has not
been expanded in the way the felony restriction has. 197 In fact, in Minnesota,
the legislature has worked to reform laws regarding voting incapacity to
remove “over- and underinclusive terminology.” 198
In contrast, the felony restriction is unique in its ability to expand and
evolve over time. The felony definition of today is remarkably different
from the felony definition of the nineteenth century. 199 The term continues
to expand, and, as a result, so does the number of people barred from
voting. Courts have refused to notice this distinction and continue to treat
felony disenfranchisement the same as any other restriction on voting.
However, no other voting restriction has been exploited in the same way.
The courts that uphold such exploitation, like the court in Schroeder, are
unable to find any legislative history that supports such expansion. The
delegates of the Minnesota Constitutional Convention drafted article VII at
a time when the definition of felony was limited, and felon
disenfranchisement clauses were not heavily enforced. 200 Their short
discussion of the provision is further evidence that the delegates did not
anticipate that the clause would have a great impact on the voting
population. 201 In fact, as noted above, the delegates themselves seemed
See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (establishing a voting age requirement of eighteen
years of age and a residence requirement of thirty days).
195

196

Id.

It is estimated that the number of individuals barred from voting in the United States
due to legal incompetence is in the thousands. See Michelle Bishop, Disability is No Reason
to Strip a Person’s Voting Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 2018),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
opinion-bishop-disabilityvoters_n_5af5b085e4b0e57cd9f9042f [https://perma.cc/XMC2-W3W4].
Note, Developments in the Law–The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114,
1183–84 (2008) (“In 2003, Minnesota changed its law from one automatically
disenfranchising those under guardianship to one disenfranchising them only after judicial
proceedings that specifically revoke their right to vote.”).
See supra Section V.C.
RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MIDNINETEENTH CENTURY 29 (2004) (“If a man was not personally known by those attending
the polls, there was no way to determine whether he had been disqualified by criminal
conviction. As a result, very few voters were challenged on the ground that they were
convicted felons.”).
See ANDREWS, supra note 24, at 540–41.
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unsure as to how the provision would impact the state. 202 While courts cite
widespread historical use of felon disenfranchisement laws as justification
for their use today, in reality, these laws are markedly different. 203 Courts in
Minnesota would be justified in treating the expansion of felon
disenfranchisement with strict scrutiny. Doing so would both respect the
language of the Minnesota Constitution and protect the fundamental right
to vote.

E.

International Law as a Comparison

Although felon disenfranchisement laws are common in the United
States, the same cannot be said for the rest of the democratic world. Felon
disenfranchisement is “far outside the international norm.” 204 The
international community has rejected permanent disenfranchisement, and
a majority of European countries impose no ban on felon voting
whatsoever. 205 In most European countries, governments even facilitate
voting by those convicted of felonies. 206 Other European countries ban only
some prisoners from voting, usually those serving long sentences for certain
serious crimes. 207 That said, a minority of European countries do
Id. A delegate at the Minnesota Constitutional Convention noted that the
disenfranchisement provision was “certainly a very stringent one, and difficult of application,
and in many cases would work great hardship.” Id.
See Order, supra note 2, at 1. The court began its historical analysis of felon
disenfranchisement by stating that “[f]elony disenfranchisement has its roots in ancient Greek
and Roman society.” Id. It went on to state that “[t]his practice similarly has a long history in
the United States,” noting that “two dozen states practice[ed] felony disenfranchisement at
the eve of the Civil War.” Id. Finally the court noted “[t]oday felony disenfranchisement is
widespread in the United States.” Id. The court wrote about felon disenfranchisement as if
the practice had remained unchanged throughout history.
Ghaelian, supra note 56, at 789.
AM. C.L. UNION, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 6 (2006). Countries that
allow all prisoners to vote include Austria, Albania, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Macedonia, the
Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland. Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4–7. Countries that ban select prisoners from voting include Belgium, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and
Romania. Id. at 7. Often the courts impose this added penalty on a case-by-case basis. Id.
Poland permits courts to disenfranchise those convicted of intentional crimes and sentenced
to more than three years in prison. Id. France bars voting only by those convicted of offenses
involving crimes of moral turpitude or crimes against the public, such as forgery or
embezzlement. Id. In Portugal, courts normally add disenfranchisement to the sentence of
a “horrendous crime or serious crime—someone that held a sentence for eight to ten years,
or fifteen years.” Id. (quoting a Portuguese official). In Greece, those in prison with life
sentences lose their right to vote forever. Prisoner Votes by European Country, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 22, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-20447504 [https://perma.cc/K3WKD4YG].
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disenfranchise all prisoners. 208
American disenfranchisement laws differ from European laws in two
respects. First, American disenfranchisement laws are unique in their ability
to reach outside of prisons. In all but sixteen states, American
disenfranchisement laws affect not only people in prison but also those
living in the community, either on probation, parole, or after completing
every aspect of their sentence. 209 Second, European countries with
disenfranchisement laws have made clear that disenfranchisement is
designed and delivered as a form of punishment. 210 In contrast, most
defenders of disenfranchisement laws in the United States tend to avoid
justifying the laws as a form of punishment. 211 Rather, proponents insist that
they are regulatory measures. 212
The United Nations “has specifically criticized the United States’
disenfranchisement policy.” 213 The United States signed and ratified two
treaties—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD)—which are both critical of blanket voting bans. 214
A General Comment to the ICCPR provides that “[i]f conviction for an
offense is a basis for suspending the right to vote, the period of such
suspension should be proportionate to the offense and the sentence.” 215 The
United Nations Human Rights Committee oversees the implementation of
AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 205, at 6. Countries that disenfranchise all prisoners
include Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia,
Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Id.
Id. at 5.
208

209
210
211

Id.
Id.; see also Defendant’s Memorandum Supporting Summary Judgment at 16,

Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020)
[hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum] (“Restoring voting rights at the completion of the
sentence is a rational choice that many other states have also made.”); Mary Sigler,
Defensible Disenfranchisement, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1725, 1728 (2014) (“[O]ffenders who
commit serious felonies are subject to regulatory disenfranchisement because they have
violated the civic trust that makes liberal democracy possible.”); Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d
1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010).
Just as States might reasonably conclude that perpetrators of serious crimes
should not take part in electing government officials, so too might it rationally
conclude that only those who have satisfied their debts to society through
fulfilling the terms of a criminal sentence are entitled to restoration of their
voting rights.

Id.
Ghaelian, supra note 56, at 790.
AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 205, at 26.
Id. at 27.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment Adopted under Article 40, Paragraph
4, of the Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 14, CCPR/C/21.Rev.1/Add.7 (1996)
(adopting comments related to G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 25 (Dec. 16, 1966)).
212
213
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the ICCPR, and the Committee has charged the United States with violating
the treaty. The Committee recommended that the United States “adopt
appropriate measures to ensure that states restore voting rights to citizens
who have fully served their sentences and those who have been released on
parole.” 216 Additionally, the ICERD monitoring body, the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, noted that it was “concerned
about the political disenfranchisement of a large segment of the ethnic
minority population who are denied the right to vote by disenfranchising
laws and practices,” which is potentially a violation of articles 1 and 5 of the
ICERD. 217
In recognizing the right to vote as fundamental, most foreign courts
examine disenfranchisement legislation by applying a proportionality
review, which is often seen as a higher threshold of review than the
American strict scrutiny test. 218 Under proportionality review, many foreign
disenfranchisement laws have been struck down. 219 For example, South
Africa’s Constitutional Court addressed the issue of whether the
government had the authority to deny prisoners the right to vote in Minister

of Home Affairs v. National Institute of Crime Prevention and the
Reintegration of Offenders (“NICRO”). The court failed to find a
220

legitimate government interest justifying disenfranchisement and held that
the government could not deprive prisoners of the right to vote simply “to
correct a public misconception as to its true attitude to crime and
criminals.” 221 Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights applied
proportionality review to a United Kingdom law that operated as a blanket
ban on inmate voting. 222 The court struck down the blanket ban but
reasoned that some disenfranchisement was acceptable to allow a
democracy to take “steps to protect itself against activities intended to
destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention.” 223 Still, the court
held that there must be a “discernible and sufficient link between the
sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned.” 224
U.N. Committee Says U.S. Bans on Former Prisoner Voting Violate International
Law, AM. C.L. UNION (2006), https://www.aclu.org/other/un-committee-says-us-bans216

former-prisoner-voting-violate-international-law [https://perma.cc/NL3K-84YR].
AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 205, at 28 (citing U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Rep. of the
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Its Fifty-Eighth Session, ¶ 397, U.N.
Doc. A/56/18 (2001)). Articles 1 and 5 of ICERD prohibit racial distinctions that effectively
impair the equal exercise of political rights. Id. at 27.
Ghaelian, supra note 56, at 798–99.
Id. at 792.
217

218
219

Minister of Home Affs. v. Nat’l Inst. of Crime Prevention & the Re-Integration of
Offenders 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) at 2 para. 2 (S. Afr.).
Id. at 27 para. 56.
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Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
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Id. at para. 71.
Id.
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While this transnational judicial discourse is not binding on the
United States, it can and has been discussed in judicial opinions rendered
by the United States Supreme Court. In New York v. United States, Justice
Frankfurter referred to Argentinean, Australian, Brazilian, and Canadian
constitutions in his majority opinion. 225 Additionally, in Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court cited European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence in holding
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to privacy. 226 In Roper v.
Simmons, when examining the application of capital punishment in cases
involving an offender under the age of eighteen, the Court cited several nonbinding treaty provisions and examined Canadian, British, and Indian
jurisprudence. 227 Similarly, courts in Minnesota could use transnational
judicial discourse to bolster a decision to restrict the expansion of felon
disenfranchisement. Rather than looking solely at comparative state laws,
which are also not binding in Minnesota, courts could broaden their analysis
to include a discussion on the constitutionality of disenfranchisement laws
worldwide. This is an especially critical discussion given that the United
States continues to face harsh criticism for its widespread use of blanket
felon disenfranchisement laws.

F.

Under Strict Scrutiny, Minn. Stat. § 609.165 Violates Minnesota’s
Equal Protection Clause

Section 609.165 easily fails strict scrutiny review, which is likely why
courts have made a concerted effort to avoid applying this standard.
However, after concluding that all voting, outside of the narrow restrictions
authorized by article VII, is a fundamental right, section 609.165 should be
reviewed under strict scrutiny. Section 609.165 applies to crimes other than
those punishable by death and is thus an expansion of disenfranchisement
and a direct infringement on the fundamental right to vote. As such, this
direct infringement is subject to strict scrutiny. 228 Under strict scrutiny review,
the state must show that the current disenfranchisement scheme is
“narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest.” 229 The compelling governmental interest must be
specifically stated, and the statute must have an “actual, and not just . . .
Jason Morgan-Foster, Transnational Judicial Discourse and Felon
Disenfranchisement: Re-Examining Richardson v. Ramirez, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.
225

279, 293 (2006).
Id. at 294.
226
227
228

Id.
See Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. 1978) (“Legislative enactments

which directly infringe such [fundamental] rights are subject to ‘strict scrutiny’ review.”).
Greene v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 725 (Minn.
2008); see also In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Minn. 2014) (“[T]he
County must carry a ‘heavy burden of justification’ to show that the classification is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” (internal citations omitted)).
229
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theoretical” connection to the governmental interest. 230
In Schroeder, the government stated that the purpose of adopting
section 609.165 was “to promote the rehabilitation of the defendant and his
return to his community as an effective participating citizen.” 231 While that
may have been the presumed purpose, there is no evidence that the statute
did, in fact, promote rehabilitation. Studies show that non-voters are more
likely to be rearrested than voters. 232 Although these studies acknowledge
that the data does not provide proof of direct causation, it is clear that
“[v]oting appears to be part of a package of pro-social behavior that is linked
to desistance from crime.” 233 Furthermore, the state cites no evidence
supporting the proposition that disenfranchising those on probation, parole,
or some form of supervision promotes rehabilitation. Evidence shows the
opposite. Preventing those on probation or parole from voting actually
stifles rehabilitation, as those who can vote are less likely to recidivate and
more likely to successfully complete probation. 234 Thus, under strict
scrutiny, the state would have a difficult time articulating a governmental
interest that is served by the statute.
The state could further argue that the felon disenfranchisement statute
is necessary to prevent voting fraud. This is a common argument among
proponents of felon disenfranchisement laws. 235 Again, there is little
evidence to support this argument, especially given the state’s blanket
restriction of all felonies regardless of the type of crime committed. 236
Another common argument made by disenfranchisement proponents is
that felons have forfeited their right to participate in government. 237 Others
State v. Russel, 447 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).
Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 211, at 16 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.09
(West 1962) (Advisory Committee’s Comment)).
CHUNG, supra note 20, at 4 (“The revocation of voting rights compounds the isolation
of formerly incarcerated individuals from their communities, and civic participation has been
liked with lower recidivism rates. In one study, among individuals how had been arrested
previously, 27 percent of non-voters were rearrested, compared with 12 percent of voters.”).
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest:
Evidence from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 214 (2004).
See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 81, at 30
(“Not only are voters less likely to recidivate than non-voters, they are ‘more likely to
successfully complete probation and parole supervision,’ as demonstrated by data from those
states where probationers and parolees are allowed to vote.” (citations omitted)).
Proponents of felon disenfranchisement have argued that past criminality may predict
future participation in electoral fraud. Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and
Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 120 (2004).
Jamie Fellner, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in
the
United
States,
SENT’G
PROJECT
(1998),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/vote/index.html#Top
OfPage
[https://perma.cc/W5AW-H4VQ].
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 27, at 12. Senator Mitch McConnell, when arguing in
favor of felon disenfranchisement stated, “[T]hose who break our laws should not dilute the
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believe that ex-felons are more likely to favor corrupt candidates or more
lenient criminal codes. 238 Still, these arguments lack solid evidentiary
support. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that states
may not fence out a class of voters because of concerns about how they
might vote. 239
Even assuming there was a legitimate government interest served by
the statute, the state would have to prove that the statute is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest. Statutes that are not “precisely tailored to serve that
compelling state interest” must be invalidated. 240 In terms of voter fraud, this
argument is outlined in the dissenting opinion of Richardson v. Ramirez.
Disenfranchisement provisions, such as section 609.165, are “patently both
overinclusive and underinclusive.” 241 The statutes are overinclusive in that
they encompass all former felons, and “there has been no showing that exfelons generally are any more likely to abuse the ballot than the remainder
of the population.” 242 Moreover, the provisions are also underinclusive in
that “many of those convicted of violating election laws are treated as
misdemeanants and are not barred from voting at all.” 243 Thus, a portion of
those at risk of committing voter fraud are not included within the
provisions.
Furthermore, if the statute’s compelling government interest is
rehabilitation, the statute most certainly could have been drafted in a less
restrictive way. The statute could disenfranchise persons incarcerated
following a felony conviction and re-enfranchise those released from prison,
including those on probation, parole, or supervised release. This would
constitute a less restrictive alternative and would still achieve the
government’s interest in rehabilitation. To survive strict scrutiny review, the
state would need to explain why expanding the statute to include people on
parole, probation, and supervised release is necessary to achieve the
governmental interest of rehabilitation. Given the contradictory evidence,
votes of law-abiding citizens.” Id. Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions has argued that “a
person who violates serious laws of a State or of the Federal Government forfeits their right
to participate in those activities of that government [because] their judgment and character is
such that they ought not to be making decisions on the most important issues facing our
country.” Michael Gentithes, Felony Disenfranchisement & the Nineteenth Amendment, 53
AKRON L. REV. 431, 437–38 (2019). Senator George Allen has also argued against reenfranchising convicted felons, stating that allowing a former felon to vote would make them
“feel like a full-fledged citizen again.” Id.
Miles, supra note 235, at 120.
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 81, at 31
(citing State v. Trahan, 870 N.W.2d 396, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 216
(Minn. 2016)).
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238
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Id.
Id.
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this would be a difficult argument for the state to make. Therefore, under
strict scrutiny review, section 609.165, as it is currently written, would likely
fail.

G.

Minnesota Statutes Section 609.165 Fails a Rational Basis Review

Even under rational basis review, Minnesota’s current
disenfranchisement scheme should not survive. The Minnesota
Constitution applies “an independent Minnesota constitutional standard of
rational basis review,” which is more stringent than the federal standard. 244
This heightened standard of review requires,
(1) The distinctions which separate those included
within the classification from those excluded must not be
manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and
substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable
basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions
and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or
relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an
evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar
to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose
of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately
attempt to achieve. 245
The court noted that this heightened standard of review “is particularly
appropriate . . . in a case such as this where the challenged classification
appears to impose a substantially disproportionate burden on the very class
of persons whose history inspired the principles of equal protection.” 246
Given the immensely disproportionate impact section 609.165 has on
people of color, this heightened standard of review would be an appropriate
standard of review to apply to this case.
The district court in Schroeder, however, disagreed. 247 The court
ultimately chose not the apply Russell’s heightened standard of review. 248 In
its order, the court first noted that the Russell heightened rational basis
standard has not been used by the Minnesota Supreme Court to strike down
a law since 1991. 249 This statement is misleading. While this heightened
rational basis standard has not been used to strike down a law since 1991,
the Minnesota Supreme Court does, in fact, continue to use Russell when

244

State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).

245

Id. at 888.
Id. at 889.
Order, supra note 2, at 8–9.
Id.
Id.
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analyzing statutes. 250 In a July 2020 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
emphasized the Russell standard, stating that:
[W]e hold lawmakers to a higher standard of evidence when a
statutory classification demonstrably and adversely affects one
race differently than other races, even if the lawmakers’ purpose
in enacting the law was not to affect any race differently. 251
The court concluded by stating that Minnesota’s equal protection
standard is not less deferential to the legislature than the federal standard,
“[b]ut where a law demonstrably and adversely affects one race different
than other races . . . our precedent under the Minnesota Constitution
requires more of lawmakers . . . than does the Fourteenth Amendment.” 252
Despite the noted adverse impact that felon disenfranchisement has in
Minnesota, the court decided not to apply the heightened standard of
review. To justify this decision, the court argued that the statute is “not the
source of the disenfranchisement.” 253 Rather, the court stated that the
Minnesota Constitution was the source of the disenfranchisement, while
section 609.165 is the “method of restoring the right to vote.” 254 Again, this
statement is misleading. The Minnesota Constitution grants the legislature
both the power to disenfranchise and to re-enfranchise. Section 609.165
does both. The statute expands the disenfranchisement authorized by the
Minnesota Constitution, as the statute uses an expansive definition of
“felony” and applies to those on probation and parole, neither of which
existed at the time the Minnesota Constitution was drafted. Thus, by
expanding disenfranchisement, the statute serves to disenfranchise as well
as re-enfranchise.
Finally, the court’s order states that the enactment of section 609.165
in 1983 “converted the process of restoring the right to vote from a
discretionary model to an automatic one.” 255 In so doing, the court reasoned
that the statute “expanded re-enfranchisement.” 256 That the statute is less
restrictive than its predecessors is irrelevant. The Russell standard for
heightened review applies when a law “adversely affects one race different
than other races.” 257 In Minnesota, African Americans comprise 4% of
Minnesota’s voting-age population but account for more than 20% of

250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257

See Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1, 25 (Minn. 2020).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 27.
Order, supra note 2, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1, 25 (Minn. 2020).
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disenfranchised voters. 258 Furthermore, American Indians comprise less
than 1% of Minnesota’s voting-age population but comprise 7% of those
disenfranchised. 259 The statute clearly has an adverse effect on people of
color. As such, the heightened standard of review should apply. The judge’s
phrasing of the statute as one that “expanded re-enfranchisement” does not
change the analysis under Russell.
Under this heightened standard of review, the government needs
“actual as opposed to theoretical factual justification for a statutory
classification.” 260 The government needs to do more than simply state that
the statute was enacted “to promote the rehabilitation of the defendant and
his return to his community as an effective participating citizen.” 261 The
government needs actual factual justification, proving that the statute does,
in fact, promote rehabilitation. In neither the State’s memoranda nor the
court’s order is such evidence provided.
The court ultimately applied a traditional rational basis review, similar
to the analysis in federal courts. As the court notes, “[t]o survive rational
basis review the challenged statute must be ‘a rational means of achieving a
legislative body’s legitimate policy goal.’” 262 The court reasoned that because
the legislature’s policy goal in enacting section 609.165 was to promote
rehabilitation by automatically restoring civil rights to persons convicted of
felonies after their sentence ended, the statute was a rational means of
achieving the legislature’s goal. 263 The court stated that “[a]lthough the
Plaintiffs advocate that the line should have been drawn elsewhere, this
Court does not have the ability to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature.” 264 The statute, the court concluded, expanded reenfranchisement. 265
While it is true that the statute converted the individualized restoration
of rights to an automatic one, the statute did not expand restoration. The
1907 statute required that a person convicted of a felony wait “one year from
the date of the judgment” to apply to the district court for reinstatement of
civil rights. 266 The one year started from the “date of judgment,” not the date
of release, contrary to what is stated in the court’s order. 267 That meant that
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 81, at 36.
See id.
Fletcher Props., 947 N.W.2d at 27.
Order, supra note 2, at 9 (citation omitted).
Id. (citing Fletcher Props., 947 N.W.2d at 19).
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Act approved March 12, 1907, ch. 34, §§ 1–2, 1907 Minn. Laws 40–41.

See Order, supra note 2, at 2 (“A 1907 statute allowed a person convicted of a felony
to apply to the courts for reinstatement of civil rights at least a year after their release from
incarceration if they had three witnesses to testify to their good moral character.” (emphasis
added)). But see Act approved March 12, 1907, ch. 34, §§ 1–2, 1907 Minn. Laws 40–41
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individuals serving sentences of one year or longer could apply to the courts
for reinstatement of their civil rights immediately after being released from
prison. Therefore, under the 1907 statute, the maximum amount of time
an individual was required to spend outside of prison without the ability to
vote was one year.
The 1963 statute changed that. By 1963, Minnesota, as well as the rest
of the country, had adopted an expansive system of parole and probation. 268
In 1965, the average parole period in the United States was twenty-nine
months. 269 Of the 89,900 people released from prison in 1965, 54,300 were
placed on parole. 270 The enactment of section 609.165, therefore, extended
the period of disenfranchisement for the majority of convicted felons in
Minnesota by an average of seventeen months. While the statute
automatically restored civil rights, the law still required an extension of
disenfranchisement for the majority of those on probation, parole, or
another form of supervised release. 271 In fact, given the new probation and
parole system, the l963 statute was the most restrictive statute that the state
had ever enacted regarding felon disenfranchisement. Before 1907, the
1867 statute immediately reinstated civil rights to all convicted felons who
finished a prison sentence without having any disciplinary violations. 272 Thus,
convicted felons with no disciplinary violations automatically had their civil
rights restored after release from prison from 1867 to 1907. In 1907, the
statute changed, requiring a maximum waiting period of one year. 273 In
contrast, the 1963 statute, section 609.165, more than doubled the average
waiting period. 274 Although the legislature claimed that the purpose of the
statute contemplated the “rehabilitation of those convicted,” it provided no
(“Before such restoration to civil rights shall take effect such person or persons shall at the
end of one year from the date of the judgment thereof or at any time thereafter first apply to
the district court” (emphasis added)).
Probation
and
Pretrial
Services:
History,
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-andpretrial-serviceshistory#:~:text=President%20Calvin%20Coolidge%20signs%20the,sentence%20in
%20the%20federal%20courts [https://perma.cc/QYV3-3SXP]. Many states passed
probation laws at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century.
Id. Massachusetts was the first state to establish a probation system in 1878. Id. The federal
government did not permit probation until the Probation Act of 1925, which was signed by
President Calvin Coolidge. Id.
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES 1850–1984, at 177 (1986).
Id. at 182. While the numbers are not available for 1965, in 1976, more people were
on probation or parole than in confinement. Id. at 180. While 457,528 people were confined
in either state or local prisons, 1,461,459 people were on probation or parole.
Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, § 609.165, 1963 Minn. Laws 1198.
Act approved Feb. 10, 1867, ch. 14, § 82, 1867 Minn. Laws 18–19.
Act approved March 12, 1907, ch. 34, §§ 1–2, 1907 Minn. Laws 40–41.
See supra text accompanying note 270–71.
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explanation for extending disenfranchisement until after the completion of
probation and parole rather than upon release from prison. 275
The rational basis standard in Minnesota requires “a reasonable
connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the
challenged classification and the statutory goals.” 276 The actual effect of
section 609.165 was to extend the minimum disenfranchisement period for
the majority of those convicted of felonies in Minnesota. While,
theoretically, the legislature may have believed that an automatic system of
re-enfranchisement would lead to increased enfranchisement, the statute
actually decreased enfranchisement. The legislature chose to make
convicted felons wait until after the completion of their probation or parole,
rather than after completion of incarceration, to vote.
Moreover, the legislature stated that the goal of the statute
contemplated the “rehabilitation of those convicted.” 277 Again, Minnesota
law looks at the actual, not theoretical, effect of a law. 278 While, theoretically,
the legislature could have believed that section 609.165 would promote
rehabilitation, in reality, research shows that democratic participation is
positively associated with a reduction in recidivism. 279 One study found that
voting behavior is “significantly correlated with subsequent measures of
incarceration, re-arrest, and self-reported criminality.” 280 Additionally,
disenfranchisement is more stigmatizing than reintegrative because it serves
to further isolate an individual from society. 281 The State, in its
memorandum, did not detail any evidence that section 609.165 has had a
real positive effect on rehabilitation. 282 The theoretical belief that the statute
would promote rehabilitation is not enough to survive Minnesota’s rational
basis review. Without such evidence, the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim
should prevail.

Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, § 609.1, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185.
State v. Garcia, 683 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2004).
Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, § 609.1, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185.
See Garcia, 683 N.W.2d at 299.
Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The
Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 407, 414
(2020).
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Id. at 415.
See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 211, at 6. “It is believed that where a

sentence has either been served a completion or where the defendant has been discharged
after parole or probation his rehabilitation will be promoted by removing the stigma and
disqualification to active community participating resulting from the denial of his civil rights.”
Id. (citation omitted). This quote describes the theoretical effect of the statute, but the
memorandum does not detail the statute’s actual effect.
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CONCLUSION

Felon disenfranchisement is a topic that has gained traction in recent
years. Courts around the country have been tasked with assessing the
constitutionality of these laws, and Minnesota is amongst the states that have
faced this question. Under federal precedent, these laws are difficult to
strike down, and only a handful of cases have been successful, all requiring
a showing of discriminatory intent. Recognizing the federal barrier, a recent
Minnesota state court case, Schroeder v. Minnesota Secretary of State,
argued that Minnesota’s felon disenfranchisement statute violates
Minnesota’s Constitution. 283 The district court ultimately held that the power
to regulate felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement lies exclusively
with the legislative branch, a holding that was affirmed by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. 284 While this may be true to an extent, the legislature’s
ability to regulate enfranchisement should not go unconstrained.
Article VII’s sanction of felon disenfranchisement should be read
narrowly, taking into account the historical use of such laws and any relevant
historical definitions. Under this reading, any expansion of felon
disenfranchisement, including the expansion contained in section 609.165,
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. At a minimum, the court should
apply Minnesota’s heightened rational standard of review. Under either
heightened standard, section 609.165 would likely be deemed
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Ramsey County court was hesitant to
apply either standard of review.
Across the country, felon disenfranchisement laws are enforced and
upheld. Rather than looking domestically, however, courts should look for
guidance abroad. On a global scale, the United States is a clear outlier, and
our disenfranchisement laws have been repeatedly condemned by
international observers. On an international level, a decision to strike down
a felon disenfranchisement law as violative of Minnesota’s state constitution
would not be revolutionary. In fact, even disenfranchising incarcerated
felons would be more extreme than the approach in most European
countries. Although the law would support such a decision, it seems unlikely
that the Minnesota Supreme Court will reverse the decision of the Ramsey
County and Minnesota Court of Appeals. While the courts clearly have the
authority to strike down the felon disenfranchisement law, they have proven
unwilling to do so. The power remains in the hands of the legislature, and
it will be up to them to amend or repeal the law.
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Order, supra note 2, at 1.
See id. at 13; Schroeder v. Simon, 962 N.W.2d 471, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021).
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